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THE MARYLAND LAW OF FIXTURES
By SHALE D. STILLER*
The law of fixtures is murky and obtuse. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code, recently enacted in Maryland,' is intended to be neither murky
nor obtuse. Although in many areas of commercial law, the Code has
succeeded in cleansing the Augean stables, the law of fixtures remains
only half-cleansed. This article will examine the Code's impact on the
law of fixtures, 2 and will conclude with a brief discussion of certain non-
Code aspects of fixtures in Maryland.'
Fixtures problems arise in many contexts. The vendor of real
estate may contend against the vendee that the contract of sale was not
intended to include an item such as a chandelier or an oil burner. The
tenant who makes improvements to leased premises may contend that
at the expiration of the lease term the improvements can be removed
by him. The heir to real estate may have claims which conflict with
those of the executor or the next-of-kin, who receive everything but
the real estate.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals with the following type of
problem: New heating equipment is installed in an apartment house.
The apartment house is already subject to the usual form of real estate
mortgage, and when the heating equipment is installed, it too is subject
to a "lien" - a "security interest" held by the vendor of the heating
equipment. The mortgagor eventually goes into bankruptcy, and the
real estate mortgagee wants to foreclose upon the apartment house,
including the heating equipment which, he contends, has become part
of the real estate and thereby subject to his mortgage. The vendor of
the heating equipment argues, however, that he certainly never intended
his equipment to feed the security of the real estate mortgage, that he
never would have installed the heating equipment unless he was as-
sured of absolute priority in the event of the mortgagor's bankruptcy,
and that he has a right to remove his heating equipment free from any
claim of the real estate mortgagee. Thus, two persons - the holders
of security interests in the real estate and in "fixtures" - claim that
their respective security interests cover the same property.
In determining the priorities between these competing interests,
pre-Code law varied throughout the United States. One approach
favored the holder of the security interest in the heating equipment if
he had followed the rules of state chattel security law in perfecting his
* Instructor, University of Maryland School of Law; Partner in Frank, Bern-
stein, Gutberlet & Conaway, Baltimore, Maryland; LL.B., Yale University (1957).
1. MD. CODE ANN. art. 95B (Supp. 1964), effective February 1, 1964.
2. There are three excellent non-Maryland articles dealing with the Code's
treatment of fixtures, all of which should be consulted by anyone with a problem in the
field. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code,
75 HARV. L. Rzv. 1319 (1962), reprinted in 2 COOGAN, HOGMN, VAGTS, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1782 (1964); Gilmore, The Pur-
chase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1963); and Kripke, Fixtures Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1964).
3. The best treatment of non-Code fixtures problems is 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 19.1-.14 (Casner ed. 1952).
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interest.4 Such an approach required that anyone searching the title to
real estate would have to search not only the land records but also the
chattel records to determine if the heaters, the air conditioners, and
other items commonly known as fixtures "belonged" to the owner of
the real estate. If the particular equities of the case demanded, however,
that the real estate security interest not be subordinated, the courts
generally following this rule would usually conclude that the particular
chattel had become so merged with the real estate that it would be
impossible to claim that the holder of the chattel security interest had
anything "determinate" on which his interest could continue to attach.
Another approach - often referred to as the so-called "Massachusetts
rule" - compelled the opposite verbal result. Quicquid plantatur solo,
solo credit - whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil.' Under
this rule, the slightest affixation would vitiate the chattel security in-
terest. Yet, to avoid harsh results, the courts would merely pay lip
service to the rule. For example, in one case it was held that something
like a 5,600 pound engine was not a fixture and that the holder of a
security interest in it would prevail over the mortgagee.
A third approach, reflected chiefly in section 7 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act (enacted in only a dozen states), rejected the
extremist verbal formulae of the first two approaches and tried to reach
some accommodation between the interests of the real estate lenders
and the chattel lenders. This accommodation often took the form of
requiring the chattel lender to record his interest in the land records if
the chattel would become a "fixture", whatever that was. There seemed
to be general agreement that this kind of recording was necessary be-
cause it was not worth the nuisance to have real estate title examiners
check both the land and chattel records. This accommodation further
demanded, however, that despite recording, the chattel lender would
have no right to remove his collateral if such removal would result in
material injury to the freehold or if the collateral was necessary to the
continuing functioning of the freehold.
It cannot be assumed that pre-Code Maryland law fell distinctly
within any one of these approaches, for it is quite difficult to correlate
into a consistent pattern the Maryland cases on the subject. All that
can be said with any confidence is that whatever the Maryland law on
the subject may once have been, it has conclusively been changed by
the Code.
The earliest of the Maryland cases was McKim v. Mason.6 This
case involved a conflict between a mortgagee of land, improvements,
machinery and fixtures, and a man who later sold to the mortgagor and
installed, with brick and cement, heavy machines resting on foundations
dug in the earth. The vendor of the machines did not reserve a security
interest but relied solely on his mechanics' lien rights. The Chancellor
and the Court of Appeals, both holding that the machines were fixtures,
4. See e.g., Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (Ct. Err. & App.
1888), and Tifft v. Horton, 53 N.Y. 377 (1873).
5. See e.g., Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860).
6. 3 Md. Ch. 186 (1852), aff'd sub nom., Denmead v. Bank of Baltimore, 9 Md.
179 (1856).
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found in favor of the mortgagee because the mechanics' lien law ex-
pressly subordinated the lien of the materialman to the lien of prior
mortgages.
The case, therefore, did not squarely present the kind of issue in-
volved in the apartment house example, because the court decided it on
the basis of a technical provision in the mechanics' lien law. By dictum,
however, the Chancellor indicated that the holder of any type of sub-
sequent security interest would be subordinated to a prior mortgagee
of real estate and fixtures. The notion that the original mortgagee
might not have contemplated or bargained for the additional security
furnished by some third party was rejected. On the contrary, the
Chancellor quoted an earlier remark of Chief Justice Shaw of Massa-
chusetts:
"The expectation of such improvement and such increased
value often enters into the consideration of the parties in estimating
the value of the property to be bound, and its sufficiency as security
for the money advanced."'7
It is possible, however, to deprecate this language, not only because it
was dictum, but also because the Chancellor said that the original mort-
gage document actually contemplated that improvements might feed the
security of the mortgage. Without this factual nuance, one cannot
predict whether the Chancellor would have gratuitously quoted Chief
Justice Shaw's remark.
In any event, the case furnishes little solace for a businessman who
furnishes consideration for the purchase of "fixtures". The borrower's
problem of financing purchases of new equipment reaches an impasse
if the borrower's prior mortgage will automatically blanket any new
equipment, unless, of course, the holder of the prior mortgage expressly
subordinates his lien to the security interest of the equipment vendor.
Elsewhere in the United States, however, the courts were begin-
ning to develop a priority for the subsequent "purchase money" interest
over the prior mortgagee. This trend, brilliantly described in a recent
article' by Professor Gilmore, began with cases involving railroads,
which had executed mortgages containing after-acquired property clauses
and then had found themselves unable to secure financing for new equip-
ment because of the sweep of the after-acquired property clause. The
Supreme Court of the United States stated the magic formula insulating
the purchase money interest from the after-acquired property mortgage
in the following words:
"A mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property can
only attach itself to such property in the condition in which it
comes into the mortgagor's hands. If that property is already
subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does not
displace them, though they may be junior to it in point of time. It
only attaches to such interest as the mortgagor acquires; and if he
7. 3 Md. Ch. at 197.
8. Gilmore, supra note 2.
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purchase property and give a mortgage for the purchase money,
. . . no general lien impending over him . . . can displace such
mortgage for purchase money."9
At first, the Supreme Court applied this doctrine only to acquisitions of
"loose property" such as rolling stock and not to parts of the permanent
structure, such as rails, which were deemed to have become part of the
freehold.'" Since most non-railroad industrial establishments did not
have property analogous to rolling stock, the Supreme Court, in 1914,
extended the priority to purchase money interests in any type of col-
lateral. Holt v. Henley" involved a question of priorities between a
real estate mortgagee and the conditional seller of a sprinkling system
which had been installed in the plant of the mortgagor. The system
consisted of a fifty-thousand gallon tank on a steel tower bolted to a
concrete foundation and of pipes which connected the tank with a mill.
There was little doubt that the system constituted a fixture and was
subject to the after-acquired property clause of the real estate mortgage.
Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"To hold that the mere fact of annexing the system to the
freehold overrode the agreement that it should remain personalty
and still belong to Holt would be to give a mystic importance to
attachment by bolts and screws . . . '[T]he mortgagees take just
such an interest in the property as the mortgagor acquired; no
more no less'."'.2
In Detroit Steel Cooperage v. Sisterville Brewing Co.," which involved
brewing tanks surrounded by a bricked-up wall, and which was decided
in the same year as Holt, Holmes went on to say that he would only
subordinate the interest of the purchase-money creditor when the article
was "to be incorporated into a structure in such a way that to remove
it would destroy the other work, like bricks or beams in a building.
Brewing tanks not being like bricks or beams, the conditional
seller was permitted to tear down the brick wall and remove the tanks,
even though the brewery could not operate without the tanks.
These developments came to be accepted by most jurisdictions.
However, the so-called "minority", or Massachusetts rule, the New
Jersey Institutional Doctrine, which denied the purchase money lender
the right to remove his collateral if such removal would imperil the
"integrity" of the enterprise or institution, and the Pennsylvania In-
dustrial Plant Mortgage Doctrine, which subjected to the real estate
mortgage all machinery, "fast or loose", did not accept the general view
of the Supreme Court.' 5
9. United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 365 (1871).
10. Galveston R.R. v. Cowdrey, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.), 459 (1871).
11. 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
12. 232 U.S. at 641.
13. 233 U.S. 712 (1914).
14. 233 U.S. at 717.
15. See e.g., note 5, supra; Russ Distrib. Corp. v. Lichtman, 111 N.J.L. 21, 166
Atl. 513 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) ; Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W.&S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
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Maryland, on the other hand, neither accepted nor rejected the
Supreme Court's rationale but seemingly ignored it in a hodgepodge of
ambiguous opinions. In Bankers & Merchants' Credit Co v. Harlem
Park Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,'6 the owners of real estate gave a mortgage
on their property to a building association. A year later, the owners
contracted for the erection of a metal garage on the rear of their prop-
erty, to be paid for in installments. The conditional vendor of the garage
recorded a memorandum of the contract in the conditional sales records.
A dispute arose over the application of the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale by the building and loan association.
The Court of Appeals held that the interest of the conditional
vendor of the garage was subordinate to the interest of the building
and loan association. The court directed its analysis solely to the ques-
tion of whether the garage was a "fixture" - if a fixture, it was subject
to the real estate mortgage; if not a fixture, it was free from the real
estate mortgage. The argument was made to the court that even if the
garage were a fixture, the conditional vendor should prevail. The argu-
ment, however, was not forcefully pressed. The conditional vendor's
brief merely cited a group of easily distinguishable Maryland cases and
made no mention either of the Supreme Court decisions in Holt and
Detroit Steel or of any theory of purchase money priority. The Court
of Appeals, it should be noted, went out of its way not only to say that
cases in other jurisdictions favoring the conditional vendor, including
Holt and Detroit Steel, which had been referred to by the court in a
previous Maryland case, "were not referred to with the view of adopting
them in this jurisdiction," but also cited with approval the whole Mas-
sachusetts line of authority, despite the fact that the Massachusetts cases
were not even mentioned in the building and loan association's brief.
With this momentum, it was not difficult for the Court of Appeals
three years later to resolve a similar conflict in favor of a prior mort-
gagee of real estate against a subsequent chattel mortgagee of a hot
water heating system, who had recorded his chattel mortgage in the
chattel records. In Heating & Plumbing Fin. Corp. v. Glyndon Perm.
Bldg. Ass'n,'7 the court merely discussed the question of whether the
heating system was a fixture, assuming that if it were, the chattel
mortgagee was out of court.
The same kind of analysis was again used in Schofer v. Hoffman,' s
where the court rejected an action in trover by the conditional vendor
of an oil heater and water tank, which had been installed upon the di-
rection of the lessees of the real property, against the owners of the
real property. The ironic aspect of this case is that the Court of Appeals,
in Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 9 a case decided even before Harlem Park,
indicated that the holder of the chattel security interest might be suc-
cessful if the conditional vendee were a lessee, on the theory that the
law usually granted a lessee of real estate, as against his lessor, a right
to remove fixtures installed by the lessee. Harlem Park had distin-
16. 160 Md. 230, 153 AtI. 64 (1931).
17. 167 Md. 222, 173 AtI. 198 (1934).
18. 182 Md. 270, 34 A.2d 350 (1943).
19. 156 Md. 368, 144 At]. 641 (1929).
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guished Wurlitzer on the ground that the latter involved a landlord-
tenant situation. Even though this argument was raised in the Schofer
case in the conditional vendor's brief, the Court of Appeals did not even
allude to it in the opinion, believing that it was either irrelevant or
unanswerable.
The Wurlitzer case contains probably the best opinion of the
Court of Appeals on this whole subject.20 Wurlitzer dealt with an
organ purchased under a conditional sales contract by the lessee of a
theater. When the tenant defaulted on the conditional sales agreement,
the conditional vendor attempted to remove it, and the landlord objected.
The court first determined that the organ was not a fixture, but then
stated that even if it were a fixture, the lessor could not prevail. The
court, citing Holt and Detroit Steel, approved the "modern equitable
rule as distinguished from the so-called Massachusetts rule to the con-
trary"'" on the ground that the lessee-conditional vendee never had title
which he could give to his lessor or mortgagee. In Harlem Park, how-
ever, as we have seen, the court claimed that it really didn't mean, in
Wurlitzer, to say that it approved of the "modern equitable rule".
Giving the Harlem Park court the benefit of the doubt, perhaps all it
was doing was applying a different rule in landlord-tenant cases. But
Harlem Park and Schofer did not readily promote a clear-cut pattern
on which Maryland lawyers could rely.
What effect does the Uniform Commercial Code have on thisjumble ?
Section 9-313,22 is the only Code section dealing entirely with
fixtures. The essence of section 9-313 is contained in subsection (5)
20. This may be attributable, in no small part, to the fact that Judges Oppenheimer
and Markell - in their pre-judicial guise - were opposing counsel.
21. 156 Md. 368, 375-76, 144 Atl. 641, 644 (1929).
22. 8 MD. Cone ANN. art. 95B (Supp. 1964) :
§ 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.
"(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a struc-
ture in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like
and no security interest in them exists under this subtitle unless the structure re-
mains personal property under applicable law. The law of this State other than
this article determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. This article
does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant
to the law applicable to real estate.(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures
takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest
in the real estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is
valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except
as stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in
the real estate at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not
in writing consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the
goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take
priority over
(a) A subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) A creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or(c) A creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to
the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained,
or the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted
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which, basically, gives to anyone with a security interest in a fixture
a right to remove the fixture if he has priority over persons who have
interests in the realty, as determined under subsections (2) and (4),
or (3) and (4). If the party with the security interest in the fixture
has priority, he may, on default by the debtor, remove the collateral
irrespective of any injury to the realty caused by the removal, provided
that he pays or gives security to the holder of any interest in the real
estate (who is not the debtor) for the cost of repairing whatever injury
to the real estate results from the removal. No reimbursement is re-
quired, however, for any diminution in the value of the real estate
which is caused simply by the absence of the goods removed. Thus,
if the holder of a security interest in the heating equipment for an
apartment house removed his equipment, he would have to pay for any
damage to the apartment (such as holes in the walls), but he would
not have to pay for the substantially greater damage to the value of the
apartment house that would be measured by the absence of heat from
the building.
If, however, the holder of the security interest in the fixture does
not have priority over the real estate mortgagee, he cannot remove his
fixture upon foreclosure, unless the holder of the real estate mortgage
consents. The rules contained in subsections (2), (3), and (4), sum-
marized below, determine the priorities between fixture-secured parties
and the holders of realty interests.
1. Preaffixation Security Interests.
Subsections (2) and (4) provide that a security interest which
has attached to a chattel before it becomes a fixture, even if not per-
fected by filing, takes priority over all existing interests in the realty;
it also takes priority over all realty interests arising after affixation
except those claimed by persons who, without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected, become purchasers for value of inter-
est in the real property, obtain a lien on the real estate, or make a con-
tract for advances under a prior recorded realty mortgage. Thus, a
fixture security interest which is perfected before the fixture is affixed
to the realty comes ahead of all present and future realty interests; the
for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A pur-
chaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer pur-
chasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has priority
over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on
default, subject to the provisions of part 5, remove his collateral from the real
estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who
is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any
physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by
the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A per-
son entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured
party gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation. It should be
noted that when California adopted the Code, it refused to adopt this section, and
Ohio, after living with it for a year, revised it substantially." See Shanker, An
Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solu-
tion to the Fixture Problem under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 73 YA, L.J. 788 (1964).
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filing of a financing statement in the land records2" before affixation will
insulate the fixture-security interest from any attack. Since most secur-
ity interests in fixtures which are perfected prior to affixation will be
purchase money interests, it is apparent that the scope of the protection
given by the Code to the person who furnishes funds for new equipment
is very broad.
2. Post-Affixation Security Interests.
Subsection (3) deals with fixture-security interests which do not
attach until after affixation. Such interests are invalid against anyone
with an existing interest in the real estate. Thus, if the debtor has
mortgaged all of his real estate, and the mortgage includes his heating
equipment, a subsequent loan made by a third party on the security of
the heating equipment would be subordinate to the interest of the real
estate mortgagee because the heating equipment had been affixed before
the new lender's interest had attached. The new lender's interest will,
however, take priority over all subsequent interests in the realty except
those in the same three classes which, under subsection (4) would also
take priority over preaffixation security interests.
The above rules can best be understood by a few simple examples.
Assume that General Electric sells an air conditioning system to the
XYZ Department Store of Baltimore City pursuant to a conditional
sales contract. The system is installed in such a manner that it becomes
a fixture under Maryland law. Despite the fact that General Electric,
in searching the records, discovered that the Second National Bank
had already recorded a mortgage encumbering all the real estate and
fixtures owned or thereafter acquired by XYZ, General Electric files a
financing statement in the proper land records of Baltimore City before
the air conditioning system is installed.
1. If XYZ defaults on its payments to General Electric, the latter
may, under the Code, remove the air conditioning system upon payment
for any damage to the real estate. The fact that the removal of the
air conditioning system impaired the value of Second National's secur-
ity in an amount far greater than the actual physical damage to the
real estate is irrelevant (albeit the removal occurs during the middle of
the summer season). Apparently, the same result will follow if General
Electric had removed old air conditioning equipment when it installed
23. The rules on filing in order to perfect a security interest in fixtures are
as follows:
§ 9-401,
"(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) When the collateral is goods which at the time the security in-
terest attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office
where, and in the same records as, a mortgage on the real estate
concerned would be indexed and filed or recorded."
§ 9-402,
"(1) When the financing statement covers ... goods which are or are to be-
come fixtures, the statement must (in addition to the general requisites
of a financing statement) also contain a description of the real estate
concerned. .. ."
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the new equipment; Second National's remedy here would be an action
for waste against XYZ.'
2. If XYZ sells or mortgages all of its assets after General Electric
has perfected its interest in the air conditioning system, the subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee is subordinate to General Electric because the
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee had at least constructive notice of
General Electric's security interest by virtue of the filing of General
Electric's financing statement in the land records.
3. If General Electric did not file a financing statement, its security
interest would not be perfected, but it would still have priority over
Second National's mortgage. General Electric's security interest would
be subordinate, however, to the interests of any subsequent bona fide
mortgagees or purchasers who, could not, in searching the land records,
discover the existence of General Electric's security interest.
4. If, however, General Electric sold the air conditioning system
to XYZ on open credit, and after it had been installed, General Electric
suddenly determined that it might be advisable to secure XYZ's debt
by means of a chattel mortgage type of arrangement, the rules of
9-313(3) would demand that General Electric be subordinate to all
preexisting interests in the real estate, even if General Electric subse-
quently filed a financing statement. The verbal rationale is that the real
estate mortgage covers the fixture in the state in which it was affixed;
if it were subject to a security interest, when it was affixed, section
9-313(2) subordinates the real estate interest; if, on the other hand,
the air conditioning system were not subject to a security interest when
it was affixed, section 9-313(3) subordinates the vendor of the fixture
despite subsequent filing. Anyone who takes an interest in the property
after the filing is, of course, subordinate to General Electric's security
interest, regardless of whether affixation preceded or succeeded filing.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the Code will reverse
the results of the old Maryland cases. Harlem Park, Heating & Plumb-
ing Finance Corp., and Schofer would all have been decided differently
under the Code even if the holder of the fixture security interests in
those cases had not filed a financing statement. These cases all involved
preaffixation fixture interests - i.e., purchase money security interests
in a fixture which attached before the fixture was affixed to the real
estate. The one Maryland case involving a fixture interest which had
"attached" before affixation, but whose result would not change under
the Code, is Abramson v. Penn." In this case, Penn sold to Redwood
Garage, Inc., under a recorded conditional sales contract, ten gas steam
radiators. The following year, Redwood Garage, Inc. sold to Abram-
son the real estate on which the radiators had been installed. When
Redwood Garage, Inc. later defaulted on the conditional sales contract,
Abramson contended that (a) Penn had no right to the radiators, the
24. Gilmore and Kripke feel that, in addition, under some circumstances, Second
National may also have an action against General Electric for removing the "trade-
in" air conditioner. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at 1366-67 and Kripke, supra note 2,
at 78-79. This possibility may impel General Electric to try to get Second National's
waiver of any rights against General Electric.
25. 156 Md. 186, 143 Atl. 795 (1928).
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radiators being fixtures which, Abramson contended, passed under the
deed to the real estate, and (b) Abramson was not on notice of the
conditional sales contract because the conditional sales recording statute
was inapplicable to chattels which later became fixtures.
Although the court found that the radiators were not fixtures and
therefore did not pass to Abramson under his deed, it did indicate, by
dictum, that if the radiators had been fixtures, Abramson would not
have been on notice of the conditional sales contract on the theory that
realty men should not be charged with notice outside of the realty
records.
"The obvious purpose of the statute was to protect the inter-
ests of vendors under conditional sales contracts, but not to permit
them to entrap or defraud innocent purchasers of real property by
inducing the illusory impression that goods and chattels integrated
with real estate and apparently a part thereof are real property,
when in fact they are not. And where the conditional sales vendor
participates in, or consents to, such integration, he should not
thereafter, as against the innocent purchaser of the realty, be heard
to say that the goods and chattels are not what they appear to be."
26
The Uniform Commercial Code fully adopts the rationale of this
dictum from Abramson. Under subsections (2) and (4) of section
9-313, Penn's security interest would be valid against all prior holders
of realty interests, without the necessity of filing a financing statement;
however, to protect himself against a subsequent purchaser such as
Abramson, or from attack by the trustee in bankruptcy of Redwood
Garage, Inc., Penn would be required to file a financing statement in
the land records.
SOME PROBLEMS UNDER THE CODE
Despite their solution of many problems, the Code rules on fix-
tures do create new ones. One difficulty relates to the recording prob-
lem where the debtor giving the security interest is not the owner of
the real estate, but is someone else, such as a lessee. A description of
the real estate in the financing statement will be useless in a jurisdiction
where only a grantor-grantee index is in use. The official version of the
Code contains nothing comparable to section 9-402(6),27 which is
Maryland's attempt to solve the problem. In Baltimore City, where the
block system is in use, the secured party of fixtures will list the block
in which the real estate is located, so that anyone searching the land
records should discover the existence of the financing statement. In
the counties, however, where there is no block system, the owner's
26. 156 Md. at 192, 143 Atl. at 797.
27. "If a statement relates to collateral which is goods which are or are to become
fixtures, such statement must state conspicuously at its top 'To Be Recorded in
the Land Records' and any such statement tendered for filing in Baltimore City or
in any county where a block system is maintained for recording papers among
the land records shall contain in the description of the real estate the house number
and street, if there be any, or the block reference."
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chain of title will not reveal the financing statement in which his lessee
was the debtor, and presumably anyone dealing with the owner does
so at his peril, unless he ascertains whether any tenant has created a
security interest.
The issue of tenant's fixtures raises an even more basic question:
is section 9-313 applicable to the holder of a security interest in a
tenant's fixtures, or is it applicable solely to the holder of a security
interest in the fee owner's fixtures? Section 9-313 probably should
apply where a long term lease is involved and the conflict is between
the leasehold mortgagee and the conditional vendor of equipment.
Where, however, the ordinary short-term lease is involved, should the
holder of the fixture-security interest be required to file a financing
statement to perfect his interest against a subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee of the lessor? The answer is not clear on the face of the
Code. Homer Kripke thinks that section 9-313 should not be applicable
to the financing of fixtures of a short-term tenant.2 8 He postulates that
since the tenant, under the law of most states, has the right of removal
as against the lessor or the lessor's mortgagee without the necessity of
giving notice,2 9 the tenant's conditional vendor should likewise not be
required to give such notice. The Maryland law clearly gives a tenant
the right to remove his fixtures,"° so that Kripke's argument would be
relevant in this State. If the conditional vendor does file, however, and
the Code rules are applicable to his filing, it could be argued that he has
rights which are greater than those of the tenant, by virtue of the fact
that he can remove his fixtures even after the tenant had violated the
lease by, for example, abandoning the premises. The problem of the
proper manner of handling a security interest in tenant's fixtures be-
comes even more serious when one considers that if the Code does not
require the conditional vendor to file, and the tenant becomes the owner
of the premises by virtue of exercising an option-to-buy in the lease, the
conditional vendor, who ordinarily does not receive notice of the exer-
cise of the option, would then not have filed even as to the owner.
Another problem which the Code does not adequately answer is
whether a materialman who sells equipment to a building contractor for
installation on the owner's land, and who retains a security interest
should be required to file a financing statement in the land records. The
owner of the land is wholly unprotected under the Code, even if the
security interest is unfiled, because the holder of the security interest
does not have to file except for protection against the people listed in
subsection (4) of section 9-313, of whom the owner of the real estate
is not one. Even if filing were required, the owner would, in order to
protect himself, be forced to search the land records during the course
of construction - an undesirable and impractical alternative. Section
28. Kripke, Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. RZv. 44,
66-69 (1964). See also Shanker, A Further Critique of the Fixture Section of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 61, 62-65 (1964).
29. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 19.10-11 (Casner ed. 1952) contradicts
Kripke at this point, by stating that the lessor's mortgagee should be given notice,
although as a practical matter the result will usually be the same under either approach
because the tenant's possession constitutes actual notice to the lessor's mortgagee.
30. See text infra, at notes 43-49.
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9-307(1) of the Code, which provides that buyers in the ordinary
course of business take the purchased property free from even perfected
security interests, is of no help to the owner because it is applicable only
to purchasers of goods, and a building contract is not a contract for the
"sale of goods". Kripke's suggestion is that the Code should be changed
to eliminate the validity of security interests in collateral which the
secured party knows is going to be installed in buildings owned by
others. He feels that such secured parties already have ample protection
under the mechanics' lien laws."'
WHAT ARE "FIXTURES"?
The venerable problem of defining "virtue" is no more difficult
than the problem of defining a "fixture". The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington put it quite bodly:
"We will not undertake to write a treatise on the law of fixtures.
Every lawyer knows that cases can be found in this field that will
support any position that the facts of his particular case require
him to take. . . . 'There is a wilderness of authority .... [Fixture
cases] are so conflicting that it would be profitless . . . to review
or harmonize them'. '"32
Ex-Chief Judge Brune, no more enamored of the problem, wrote
"The problem as to what do and what do not constitute fixtures
is often a difficult one, and there is a considerable twilight zone."33
That these remarks are not exaggerated may perhaps be demon-
strated by attempting to reconcile a Maine case holding that a log
chain was a fixture and therefore to be dealt with as if it were real
estate,3 4 with a Massachusetts case holding a firmly attached 5,600
pound engine to be a personal property. 5
This lack of a precise dividing line between personal property,
fixtures, and real estate is not, unfortunately, remedied by the Code.
Section 9-313 begins by forcefully denying the ability to obtain a secur-
ity interest in "goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of
lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like . . . unless
the structure remains personal property under applicable law." The
supplier of lumber cannot, for example, retain a security interest in the
31. There would appear to be nothing improper, under the Code as presently
drafted, in having both a security interest and a mechanics lien on the same collateral.
One other problem, not discussed in this article, but analyzed in the articles cited in
note 2 supra, is the question of priorities between a construction lender and the holder
of a security interest in fixtures. Another difficult problem is caused by the fact that
the fixture filing rules are applicable when the financing statement covers goods which
"are or are to become fixtures". If the secured party does not know where the debtor
plans to affix the fixtures, the secured party will not have a description of the real
estate and will not know the jurisdiction in whose land records a statement should
be filed.
32. Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 695, 172 P.2d 216, 218 (1946).
33. Born v. Hammond, 218 Md. 184, 190, 146 A.2d 44, 47 (1958).
34. Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Me. 154 (1829).
35. Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, 5 N.E. 160 (1886).
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lumber and remove the lumber if the owner defaults. As to lumber and
the other types of goods referred to in the first sentence of section
9-313, the only secured protection is by means of the real estate
mortgage or the mechanics' lien.
The draftsmen of the Code then hibernate and blandly state: "The
law of this state other than this Act determines whether and when
other goods become fixtures."
That portion of the Maryland law which defines the word "fix-
tures", emanates primarily from the so-called "leading case", Dudley
v. Hurst,6 which was a contest between the holder of an 1883 mort-
gage covering land, "buildings and improvements" and the holder of
an 1885 mortgage covering only machinery. The question was whether
the machinery constituted "fixtures", because if it did, it would have
been covered by the prior mortgage. The Court of Appeals laid down
the following rules, which, by endless repetition, have attained with the
court the status of Holy Writ:
"The tests by which a fixture is determined are generally these:
1st. Annexation to the realty either actual or construc-
tive.
2nd. Adaptation to the use of that part of the realty with
which it is connected.
3rd. The intention of the party making the annexation,
to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold, this
intention being inferred from the nature of the article an-
nexed, the situation of the party making the annexation, the
mode of annexation, and the purpose for which it was
annexed....
"Of these tests the most important is the question of intention.
This is clearly shown by the fact that the law is very different
between landlord and tenant and mortgagor and mortgagee, or
what is the same, vendor and vendee. Many things being held as
fixtures between vendor and vendee, which do not lose their
character of personal chattels when the question is between land-
lord and tenant. ...
"That where in the case of machinery the principal part
becomes a fixture by actual annexation to the soil, such part of it
as may not so physically annexed, but which if removed would
leave the principal thing unfit for use, and would not of itself and
standing alone be well adapted for general use elsewhere, is con-
sidered constructively annexed.
"Thus the key of a lock, the sail of a wind-mill, the leather
belting of a saw-mill, although actually severed from the principal
thing, and stored elsewhere, pass by constructive annexation. They
must be such as go to complete the machinery which is affixed to
the land, and which, if removed, would leave the principal thing
incomplete and unfit for use....
36. 67 Md. 44, 8 AtI. 901 (1887).
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"In this case there are some articles not actually annexed to
the soil, such as crates, capping machines and work tables, but are
essentially necessary to the working of the principal machinery,
and pass by constructive annexation. The main machinery would
not be in working condition without them, and they are not
adapted for general purposes.""7
In making the above comments, the Court of Appeals placed Mary-
land in the mainstream of American law. English law had discarded
"intention" as irrelevant in determining whether an item was a "fix-
ture". English cases emphasized the nature of the object and the man-
ner of its annexation rather than the intention of the affixor or the
relation of the parties. (It is curious to note, however, that before the
16th Century, it was the English custom to take out the windows upon
moving away from a house.) 3 ' The American rule, and the Maryland
rule as exemplified in Dudley's progeny, does not completely ignore
the nature of the object and the manner of its annexation, but considers
these as merely helpful factors in determining the intention of the
affixor which is the ultimate fact in determining the presence of a
"fixture".3 9
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in understanding this area is a
semantic one. To the uninitiated, the word "fixture" automatically
connotes something which is "fixed" or "affixed" to the real estate.
Dudley demonstrates, however, that even a key to a lock can be a fix-
ture. The basic determination which must be made is whether the item
in question is essential to the functioning of the property. Dudley pays
lip service to the materialistic concept of "affixation" by suggesting that
"affixation" includes not only "physical affixation" but also something
called "constructive annexation", and that an object is constructively
annexed if other objects used in connection with the real estate could
not properly and efficiently function without the particular object in
question.
The underlying policy behind these verbalistic gyrations is said to
be the promotion of industrial development. A tenant who installs
machinery, without which the real estate cannot profitably be operated,
cannot realistically be expected to install the machinery if he will not
be permitted to remove the machinery at the end of his term. Therefore,
the courts will say, in the landlord-tenant context, either that his ma-
chinery is not a "fixture" or that, even if it is a "fixture", it can be
removed from the premises by the tenant. The owner of real estate who
37. Supra note 36, at 47-48, 50-51, 8 Atl. at 902-03. The introductory portion of
the quoted language is itself a quotation from Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853),
the leading American case.
38. Coogan, "The Uniform Commercial Code and the Real Property Lawyer(Panel Discussion)", in PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SEctioN or REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW 6, 10 (Aug. 1963).
39. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPE4RTY, §§ 19.1-.4 (Casner ed. 1952). Even the
"intention" test is not free from ambiguity. The courts, including the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, have never made it plain whether the intention "is the unilateral inten-
tion of the annexor at the time of annexation, or the bilateral intention of the parties
to some transaction relating to the chattel or to the land, and whether it is the actual
intention, or the manifested intention, or the imputed intention. . . ." Id. at § 19.1.
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installs machinery on his own land, however, does so for the good of
the property, and his trustee in bankruptcy should not be able to dis-
member the plant by contending that the real estate mortgagee should
be prevented from foreclosing on the machinery as well as the real estate.
The rules and the policy can be stated with great simplicity. There
are few things less fruitful, however, than trying to state with simplicity
a "reconciliation" of the judicial attempts to apply these rules to con-
crete situations, and this paper will afford no panacea to the lawyer who
wants to know whether a specific item is or is not a fixture. Indeed, the
word "fixture" has become charged with so many different levels of
meaning that it would be a boon to the profession if the word were
exorcised. Lawyers and judges alike have failed to realized that all too
often they have used the concept of a "fixture" as both a premise and a
conclusion; too little attention has been given to an analysis of the fol-
lowing type of question - "Is it a fixture because it can be removed,.
or can it be removed because it is a fixture?"
When the Uniform Commercial Code, in defining a fixture, re-
treats behind the shaky facade of Maryland law, it thereby subjects the
Maryland lawyer to a rather ill-defined body of law. It is fair to assume
that the above-quoted language from Dudley will dominate Maryland
attempts to define a fixture, for purposes of applying section 9-313. It
is also fair to assume that those Maryland cases which have dealt with
the question of whether certain objects were subject to a real estate
mortgage will be of major importance, because this is the very context
in which Code problems will arise. Indeed, it would not be rash to
state the "law of this State", referred to in section 9-313 for purposes
of defining a "fixture", means only the Maryland law defining a fixture
for purposes of determining whether the item in question is subject to
a real estate mortgage (or deed), and that the landlord-tenant cases, or
cases arising in other contexts, are wholly irrelevant.
Fortunately, the Maryland cases are not legion. In each case. the
court concluded either that the property in question was subject to the
real estate mortgage and therefore deserved the label "fixture", or that
the property in question was not subject to the real estate mortgage and
therefore retained its status as "personal property". Each of the cases
repeat many of the themes of the Dudley quotation, and if a halting
summary must be offered, it is this: as against a real estate mortgagee.
any machinery or other chattel will be considered to be a "fixture" and
therefore within the ambit of the mortgage, unless (1) it can be re-
moved with minimal injury to the premises, and (2) it can, after re-
moval, be used in another business or building."
40. The kinds of items which have been held to be fixtures are illustrated in the
following Maryland cases: Schofer v. Hoffman, 182 Md. 270, 34 A.2d 350 (1943)
(oil heater and water tank) ; Anderson v. Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 172 Md. 94,
190 Atd. 747 (1937) (crane and drills were integral parts of the entire granite cutting
system, and if removed, would render useless the other units; also the units not perma-
nently affixed would not be well adapted for general use elsewhere) ; Bankers & Mer-
chants Credit Co. v. Harlem Park Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 160 Md. 230, 153 Atl. 64 (1931)
(16 x 18 foot metal garage, supported by six steel columns, sunk into concrete piers
to the depth of 14 inches, the piers being set to a depth of 3 feet) ; Solter v. McMillan,
147 Md. 580, 128 Atl. 356 (1925) (various rings and molds, which were part of
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The absence of precision in definition will have one inevitable
result. Cautious lenders, not anxious to take the risk of guessing wrong,
will treat their security as both fixtures and personal property; they will
file a financing statement covering the fixtures in the land records and
a financing statement covering the same equipment, but describing it
as a certain type of personal property, in the Regular Financing State-
ment Records." Even a third type of filing is permissible, for the Code
expressly permits the holder of a security interest in a fixture to perfect
his interest by means of a regular real estate mortgage." A further
filing problem may exist if the secured party has some concern over
whether the collateral is actually real estate (in the nature of lumber,
bricks, etc.) and not a fixture at all, in which case, the Code would be
inapplicable. Here the safest course will be either to obtain a real estate
mortgage or to record in the land records a waiver from the holders of
all existing interests in the real estate.
machinery used to make tires; without the rings and molds the machinery couldn't
turn out tires and couldn't be used by any other company; rings and molds were
essential not merely to the mere physical movement of the machinery but also to the
efficient working of the machinery); Warren Mfg. Co. v. Mayor & City Council,
119 Md. 188, 86 Atl. 502 (1913) (machinery in mills) ; Dudley v. Hurst, 67 Md. 44,
8 Atl. 901 (1887) (boiler placed upon a brick foundation in a boiler house built for
that purpose; in order to remove the boiler, which weighed about 10,000 pounds, it
would have been necessary to pull down the whole boiler house) ; Kirwan v. Latour,
5 Md. (1 H.&J.) 175 (1802) (pumps, cisterns, iron grating and door used in a
distillery).
Among the cases finding that an item was not a fixture are: Consolidated Gas
Co. v. Ryan, 165 Md. 484, 169 Atl. 794 (1934) (electric traveling crane which moved
along rails attached to a building, used solely to pick up a load from one part of
the building to carry it to another part of the building; crane could be removed without
injury to the building at a cost of not more than $150, it could be used for any busi-
ness in any building in which it could be operated, and it was not actually annexed
to the building) ; Homeseekers Realty Co. v. Silent Automatic Sales Corp., 163 Md.
541, 163 Atl. 841 (1933) (portable oil burner except for pipes and tubing; but if the
oil burner were removed, the pipes and tubing could be kept if someone else ever
wanted oil heat) ; Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 Atl. 641 (1929) (organ
installed in a theater on a floor frame which had been nailed to the floor; the organ
could have been removed without damaging the premises, it was not peculiarly adapted
to the theater in question, because it could be used anywhere and could be replaced
by any ordinary pipe organ of the same size) ; Abramson v. Penn, 156 Md. 186, 143
Atl. 795 (1928) (gas steam radiators, weighing about 600 pounds each, which could
readily be removed without damage to the property; "the radiators were . . . ten
separate heating appliances, having no more connection with the freehold than an
ordinary gas heater, portable kitchen range, or heating stove, which are . . . not
fixtures"; The court distinguished cases where pipes were readily removable but which
were a necessary part of a heating plan which was itself part of the freehold).
41. Cautious lenders will also be certain that both financing statements are
executed originals, and that one is not a photostatic copy of the other. See In re Kane,
55 Berks County L.J. 1, 7, 9 (Pa. 1962). The scattershot approach of double filing
and even triple filing should seriously reduce lawyers' fees, because it will no longer
be essential for the lawyer to spend hours of erudite research in determining whether
a given item is a "fixture".
42. MD. CODE ANN. art. 95B, § 9-313(1) (Supp. 1964). If a real estate mortgage
is used, the proper procedure upon default is not clear. Section 9-501(4) states that
if a security agreement covers realty and personal property, the secured party may
proceed under the real estate law as to both, or under the real estate law as to the
realty and under the Code as to personal property. If the latter alternative is adopted,
the Code is silent as to the manner in which the secured party would proceed as to
fixtures, if fixtures were also part of the collateral.
THE MARYLAND LAW OF FIXTURES
LANDLORD-TENANT
The Maryland cases dealing with conflicts between a tenant de-
sirous of removing his fixtures and a landlord who wants the fixtures
to remain are, as previously indicated, probably not relevant in deter-
mining whether an object is a "fixture" for purposes of applying
section 9-313. The basic reason is that the usual rules of fixture law
are not applicable in the "landlord-tenant" context.
The rationale of the different rule is stated as follows:
"The rigor of the common law rule that any article that had
become a fixture was considered a part of the freehold has been
gradually relaxed as between landlord and tenant, so that articles
which have been affixed to the premises by a tenant for the pur-
poses of trade, of domestic convenience, or of ornament, may be
removed by him, although, strictly regarded, they have become
fixtures, provided, however, that they can be removed without
serious injury to the premises ...
"The intent with which an article is annexed to the land or
used in association with it is likely to be different in those cases
in which one has a temporary interest in land, as a tenant, and in
those in which one has a permanent interest, as vendor and vendee,
one under contract to sell and one under contract to buy, and
mortgagor and mortgagee of the realty. In those instances in
which the attachment to the land has been made by a permanent
owner, the general presumption of law is that the fixtures have
become part of the realty, because most structures erected upon
land by its permanent owners are usually intended to be perma-
nent. This presumption, however, may be overcome by direct
evidence that such was not the intent of the party by whom the
article was annexed, or by the stronger adverse presumption that
may sometimes arise from the application of the criteria for deter-
mining whether the article annexed is realty or personalty."43
The leading fixture cases in Maryland in the landlord-tenant area
are Northern Central Ry. v. Canton Co.," Thompson Scenic Ry. v.
Young,45 and Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen." In the Northern Central case,
Canton granted to Northern Central a license to build a railway track
over Canton's property. When the license was later revoked, the ques-
tion arose as to whether Northern Central could remove the rails and
other materials which constituted part of the railway. "No matter how
strongly attached to the soil or firmly imbedded in it, they are treated
as personal property, and as such subject to removal by the person
erecting them."'47
43. Homeseekers Realty Co. v. Silent Automatic Sales Corp., 163 Md. 541, 546-47,
163 Atl. 841, 843 (1933).
44. 30 Md. 347 (1869).
45. 90 Md. 278, 44 Atl. 1024 (1899).
46. Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 Atl. 641 (1929).
47. 30 Md. at 352.
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The court also referred to "another exception to the general rule"-
"structures upon the land of another, which have been erected by
the builder at his own cost and for his own exclusive use, as dis-
connected with the use of the land. If so erected with the knowl-
edge and assent of the owner of the land, the title remains in the
builder; and the property is held by him as a personal chattel. Thus
it is not so much the character of the structure as the circumstances
under which it was erected, that will determine whether it passes
with the realty, or is to be treated as personal property."4
In Thompson Scenic Ry. v. Young, the lessor leased vacant land
to Kuehn who intended to build a summer resort. Kuehn contracted
with the plaintiff for the construction by the latter of a scenic railway,
which consisted not only of a railway, but also of a pavilion and a
foundation made of brick piers "the entire apparatus ... was to be con-
structed in a firm and substantial manner." Plaintiff, however, retained
the ownership and possession of the railway plant and the right to oper-
ate it, until it was paid for, when it would be delivered to Kuehn. Kuehn
also was supposed to erect a casino, hotel and various amusement rooms,
which would attract people to the railway. Kuehn became financially
embarrassed, however, and plaintiff proceeded to remove, with the con-
sent of Kuehn's receiver, its railway. At this point, the landlord at-
tempted to enjoin the removal of the railway and to distrain upon it
for rent. The court stated:
"The proposition that a tenant cannot remove from demised
premises structures erected by him therein which are so attached
to the freehold as to become part of it, is a familiar principle of
common law.
"A well-recognized exception, however, to the general rule
permits the tenant to remove during his term structures erected by
him, designed for the purposes of trade, even though they be so
firmly attached to the freehold that he would not otherwise have
the right to remove them. . . . This exception in favor of trade
fixtures has been held applicable in the cases we have cited to
houses, steam engines, furnaces, railway tracks, cider mills and
like structures. The real question in such cases is not so much
the nature of the structure as the purpose for which it was in-
tended." 49
The court held that the tenant could remove, although the opinion
apparently indicates that in the usual case, the landlard can distrain for
rent. Finally, in fflurlitzer, the court held that an organ, installed in a
theater in a floor frame which had been nailed to the floor, could be
removed by the tenant.
The law of fixtures occupies one other interesting niche in the
history of the warfare between landlords and tenants. If a tenant re-
newed his lease at common law, the fixtures which he installed in the
48. 30 Md. at 353.
49. 90 Md. at 281-82. 44 Ati. at 1025.
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original term were deemed to have been abandoned by him at the end
of the original term, so that he could not remove them at the end of
the renewal term. The only way a tenant could protect himself was by
expressly reserving the right to remove his fixtures at the end of the
renewal term. Carlin v. Ritter,5" and Bauernschmidt Brewing Co. v.
McColgan,51 revealed to two tenants, who failed to make the express
reservation, all the rigors of the common law. In 1898, a benign legis-
lature changed the common law rule by what is now Article 53,
Section 38:
"The right of a tenant to remove fixtures erected by him under
one demise or term shall not be lost or in any manner impaired by
reason of his acceptance of a new lease of the same premises with-
out any intermediate surrender of possession."
The statute was applied in Rasch v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 2 where
a tenant was permitted to remove an elevator, where the only damage
to the building was a few holes in the elevator shaft caused by with-
drawal of bolts.
Taxation
Tax law has refused to have any truck with the law of fixtures.
In a case involving an attempt by a taxpayer to contend that fixtures
were not subject to personal property taxation, the Court of Appeals
said:
"But in Maryland . . . the doctrine of:fixtures, as between
vendor and vendee, lessor and lessee, mortgagor and mortgagee,
though recognized here as to these parties, has never been imported
into the law of taxation. We do not doubt that as between these,
this machinery would be held to be part of the realty, but it by no
means follows that it should be so held here.""3
In Canton Co. v. Comptroller,4 the issue was the applicability of
the sales tax law to rentals for bridge cranes located on an ore pier,
which had been mounted on rails but which could not leave the pier.
They were specially designed for that location and were not suitable
for use elsewhere. The court said that:
"It may well be that if the question was whether they were
subject to the terms of a mortgage, they could be regarded as
constructively annexed to the real estate. . . . For present pur-
poses, we would agree that they are an integral part of the pier
operation, cannot be removed without dismantling by cutting the
metal, and are not well adapted to general use elsewhere, if, indeed,
they would be salable except for scrap."5
50. 68 Md. 478, 13 At. 370 (1888).
51. 89 Md. 135, 42 Atl. 907 (1899).
52. 136 Md. 435, 111 Atl. 121 (1920).
53. County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co., 99 Md.
481, 484, 58 Ati. 211, 212 (1904).
54. 231 Md. 294, 190 A.2d 92 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 58 (1963).
55. 231 Md. at 297, 190 A.2d at 93-94.
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Nevertheless, the court felt that the sales tax law applied to all machinery
and equipment without regard to the doctrine of constructive annexa-
tion.5
6
The United States Treasury Department, in the acknowledged
wisdom with which it promulgates income tax regulations, has adopted
the same approach, in stating that the law of fixtures will be without
relevance in determining whether an item shall be subject to the
investment credit.5 7
CONCLUSION
There can be little argument about the fact that the Uniform
Commercial Code clarifies and solves in a sensible manner many of the
"fixtures problems" which have existed in Maryland. The Code, how-
ever, is not perfect, not only because of defects in its internal workings,
but also because of its unrealistic assumption that "state law" will afford
a reliable definition of a "fixture". It is hoped that the Permanent
Editorial Board, formed by the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to recom-
mend changes in and amendments to the Code, will consider solutions
to the difficulties which render less than perfect the Code's treatment
of fixtures.
56. See also Comptroller v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 223 Md. 384, 162 A.2d
886 (1960).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1964) ("Conversely, property may be personal prop-
erty for purposes of the investment credit even though under local law the property is
considered to be a fixture and therefore real property.")
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